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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Danielle Schreiner pled guilty in one case to 
grand theft by possession of stolen property and was sentenced to ten years, with five 
years fixed.  Ms. Schreiner, in a separate case, pled guilty to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years with one year fixed.  The district 
court initially placed Ms. Schreiner on probation in both cases; however, after she 
admitted a second time that she violated her probation in the two cases, the district 
court revoked her probation.   
On appeal, Ms. Schreiner asserts that the district court deprived her of her 
constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection when it revoked her 
probation, telling her it was incarcerating her in order to prevent her from becoming 
pregnant.   
Additionally, Ms. Schreiner asserts that the district court erred in revoking her 
probation as her probation violations did not warrant revocation, and further erred in 
denying her I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motions for leniency in light of the new or 
additional information she submitted in support of her motions.   
 This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that the district 
court did not violate Ms. Schreiner’s constitutional rights when it incarcerated her in 
order to prevent her from becoming pregnant. 
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Schreiner’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 3 
ISSUES 
1. In revoking Ms. Schreiner’s probation to prevent her from becoming pregnant, did 
the district court violate Ms. Schreiner’s constitutional rights to privacy, due 
process, and equal protection? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Ms. Schreiner’s probation?1 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Schreiner’s Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motions in both cases? 
 
 
                                            
1 The issues of Ms. Schreiner’s probation revocation and Rule 35 motion were fully 
briefed in her initial Appellant’s Brief; thus, additional argument on these two issues will 
not be made in this Reply Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Ms. Schreiner’s Privacy, Equal Protection, And Due Process 
Rights Under The Idaho And U.S. Constitutions When It Revoked Her Probation In 
Order To Keep Her From Becoming Pregnant  
 
Danielle Schreiner suffers from drug addiction.  (PSI, p.107.)  While pregnant and 
on probation in 2015, Ms. Schreiner admitted that she smoked methamphetamine on 
two occasions.  (10/14/15 Tr., p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.8; R., p.526.)  Although her (twin) 
babies were born healthy, the district court found her actions egregious and revoked her 
probation.  (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-18.)  After reviewing the history of Ms. Schreiner’s 
treatment while on probation, the district court told Ms. Schreiner “I find that probation 
has not served its intended purposes, that the violations in this case are willful.  They 
are particularly willful to me for one reason and one reason alone:  Any woman who 
uses methamphetamine while pregnant does not deserve to live in a free society, as far 
as I’m concerned.  And you discuss that with the court of appeals and the State if you 
think I’m wrong.” (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-7.)  Thereafter, the district court revoked her 
probation, saying it was “not going to take a chance for the next six years that you’re 
going to get pregnant again and use meth and potentially destroy another child’s life.”  
(10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-13.)  Such violated Ms. Schreiner’s rights to privacy, equal 
protection, and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sections 
2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution because the district court told Ms. Schreiner it was 
sending her to prison for six years in order to prevent her from becoming pregnant and 
possibly using methamphetamine while pregnant.  Had Ms. Schreiner not been a 
woman capable of bearing children, she would presumably have been allowed to 
continue on probation.   
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The State argues that there is no constitutional violation (Respondent’s Brief, 
pp.15-17), but fails to address Ms. Schreiner’s citations to United States Supreme Court 
authority holding that the right to procreate is constitutionally protected.  See Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.7-10 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541–542 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. 
State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972)). 
The United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to procreate.  Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  As the United States Supreme Court said in Skinner, “[w]e 
are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.  
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”  316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention 
a privacy right, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that one facet of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is “a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.  
Included in the right to personal privacy absent unjustified governmental interference 
are personal decisions relating to procreation and contraception.  See Skinner, 316 U.S. 
at 541-42; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54 (White, J., concurring in the result). 
The United States Supreme Court has held: 
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of 
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a 
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right first 
explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, and 
most prominently vindicated in recent years in the contexts of 
contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra; 
and abortion, Roe v. Wade, supra; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 
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739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). This is 
understandable, for in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate 
of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or 
to prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive.  
 
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977).  That is, when a 
“decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, 
regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, 
and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”  Id.  431 U.S. at 686 
(internal citations omitted).  Ms. Schreiner has established her constitutionally protected 
right to procreate. 
Ms. Schreiner asserted that the district court violated her constitutional rights by 
incarcerating her to prevent her from conceiving a child.  While it does not appear that 
this specific issue has previously been addressed in the appellate courts in Idaho, a 
look at how other courts have dealt with a somewhat similar issue—a probation 
provision forbidding a probationer from becoming pregnant—may be instructive.   
Courts in other jurisdictions have routinely struck provisions in a probation 
agreement ordering a female defendant not to become pregnant while on probation.  
See State v. Fatland, 882 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (holding condition 
prohibiting probationer from becoming pregnant should be eliminated as it impinges 
upon her fundamental right to procreation); People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992) (holding a condition prohibiting a defendant from getting pregnant during 
the term of her probation was unlawful and must be stricken); Rodriguez v. State, 378 
So.2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding a condition of probation prohibiting 
defendant from becoming pregnant was invalid because the condition was not 
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reasonably related to future criminality); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290–91 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating a condition of probation prohibiting defendant from 
becoming pregnant, finding the condition “excessively impinges upon her privacy right 
of procreation and serves no discernible rehabilitative purpose”); State v. Mosburg, 768 
P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (finding the probation condition ordering the 
defendant to refrain from becoming pregnant should be stricken because it unduly 
intruded upon her right to privacy); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1976) (finding a condition prohibiting defendant from having another child during 
the five-year probationary period was void because it was unconstitutional and an 
unreasonable burden); but see State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding a condition of probation requiring a defendant to complete drug counseling and 
anger management treatment before fathering any children should be upheld because it 
did not impose a total ban on his reproductive rights); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 
212–13 (Wis. 2001) (upholding a condition prohibiting a defendant from fathering any 
more children until he demonstrated he had the ability to support them and was 
supporting the children he already had, finding the condition was reasonable and not 
overly broad as it was less restrictive than incarceration). 
Where courts across the country have found that imposing as a condition of 
probation an order against procreating, this Court should find the circumstances in 
Ms. Schreiner’s case to be even more drastic, and thus unacceptable.  Imprisonment of 
a female in order to prevent procreation strikes at the very heart of a citizen’s liberty 
interest.  Further, probation “[c]onditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable 
constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether 
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the limitation does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.”  
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Further, the State claims that the error is not clear from the record; however, the 
district court specifically told Ms. Schreiner that “for one reason and one reason alone” it 
found she had willfully violated her probation—because she had used 
methamphetamine while pregnant.  (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-5.)  After making additional 
comments including that Ms. Schreiner did not deserve to live in a free society because 
she used methamphetamine while pregnant, the court revoked her probation.  (10/14/15 
Tr., p.18, Ls.4-15.)  Thus, absent that finding, Ms. Schreiner presumably would be on 
probation rather than serving a prison sentence to keep her from procreating. 
The State tries, but cannot logically explain how a sentence that attempts to 
protect the unborn (unconceived) from gestational drug exposure is “rooted in 
community protection.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.19.)  “Community protection” is typically 
used in the context of protecting the community from danger.  “When determining 
whether the sentence is excessive, we must consider: (1) the protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the defendant and others; (3) the possibility of the defendant's 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for the defendant.” State v. Strand, 
137 Idaho 457, 460–61 (2002) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in placing 
greater emphasis on the need to protect the community where defendant had a history 
of engaging in forcible sexual contact with underage females).  The consideration of 
whether the district court’s decision serves “community protection” purposes or 
adequately “protects the community” is, in Idaho, often used in discussing the Sex 
Offender Registration Act (SORA) and the risk posed by sex offenders.  
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See, i.e., State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 (2011); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009).  
The appellate courts have also used this terminology when discussing the waiver of a 
juvenile into adult court—whether juvenile facilities would adequately protect the 
community in light of the defendant’s risk to reoffend and the fact that juvenile facilities 
mandate release by age 21.  See In Re Doe, 147 Idaho 243 (2009). 
In arguing that the incarceration of Ms. Schreiner was necessary for “community 
protection” (Respondent’s Brief, pp.16-17), the State relies on the Court’s recent 
decision in State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790 (2016), thereby conflating the potential 
dangerousness of releasing a developmentally disabled defendant convicted of forcibly 
sodomizing two six-year old boys into the community to reside in an unsecure facility, 
with the chance that Ms. Schreiner might, in the next six years, get pregnant, use 
methamphetamine while pregnant, and give birth to a child who had been exposed to 
methamphetamine in utero.   
The State claims that the incarceration of Ms. Schreiner to prevent her from 
potentially becoming pregnant and potentially using drugs while pregnant advances a 
“community protection” purpose.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.16-19.)  However, the State 
apparently misunderstands the meaning of “community protection” and the effects of 
drug use on fetuses.  Even if Ms. Schreiner had given birth to a drug-addicted baby 
(or babies), which she did not, such an infant would not thereafter pose a danger to the 
community.  While it is a sad circumstance when a baby is born who is addicted to 
controlled substances, the concern is not that of “community protection,” but that the 
baby will need specific treatment for the first days or weeks of its life.   
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Further, the State’s argument that “the district court was not trying to prevent 
Schreiner from becoming pregnant” (Respondent’s Brief, p.19), but was instead trying to 
prevent Ms. Schreiner from using meth while pregnant or “harming the unborn” 
(Respondent’s Brief, p.19) is nonsensical as Ms. Schreiner was not pregnant; thus, the 
State is really arguing in favor of protecting an unconceived fetus from the acts of its 
non-pregnant mother.   
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Schreiner respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an 
order that she be placed back on probation or, alternatively, that it remand her case with 
an order that a new probation violation disposition hearing be held in front of a different 
district court judge. 
 
 DATED this 1st day of November, 2016. 
 
      ________/s/______________________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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